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While many revolutionary, grassroots organizations spring up on the eve of a revolution 
and disperse shortly thereafter, the women of The Revolutionary Association of the 
Women of Afghanistan (RAWA) have been struggling for a revolution for thirty-five 
years. Much of the literature on Afghan women examines their victimization under 
repressive cultural and political practices. The stereotypical view of an Afghan woman is 
a fully veiled, demure creature who has been battered by the men and regimes that govern 
her country and life. My examination of RAWA seeks to shatter this myopic stereotype, 
and to recognize these women for more than the token quality of their gender, but for 
their endurance and prowess as resistance activists. I argue that RAWA’s ability to not 
only survive, but also to thrive, is due to their astute use of infrapolitics. That is, RAWA 
has adapted their political tactics to counteract the particular oppression of each regime 
they have encountered from 1977 up to today. Such adaptability includes shifting from 
highly visible political action such as protests to clandestine political action embedded in 
humanitarian work. RAWA’s revolution is one that will be satisfied not by the changing 
of regimes—they have survived countless—but by a revolution that will be realized when 
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1Thirty-Five Years of Revolution: An Analysis of the Infrapolitical Tactics of the 
Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan
I  don’t fear death; I  fear remaining silent in the face o f injustice ...I say to those who 
would eliminate my voice: lam ready, wherever and whenever you might strike. You can 
cut down the flower, but nothing can stop the coming of the spring.
Malalai Joya, 2009
There comes a point, it seems, in every struggle, the weight barring down and the 
road stretching long, that small changes and reforms no longer sustain hope—when 
changes to the status quo will only result in a more deformed reality. This is the point 
when the seeds of revolution are planted in the worn soil of the mind. Perhaps this 
moment is the moment of resolve for both the individual and collective psyche. This, of 
course, is not the point in which spontaneous revolts will erupt in the streets. No. 
Revolutions are delicate things. The soil is exhausted. It has been tilled, torn, and abused 
many times. The seeds need protection and constant nurturing. But beyond this point are 
whispers soft as rain. Ideas flow feeding parched minds. People gather. Hidden arbors 
of discussion, assembly, and organization shelter the seeds of revolution. Once roots 
have grown deep and leaves spread toward the sun, once revolution begins one expects 
swift action; vines choke out the old and make way for the new in the blink of the 
historical eye.
During the Arab Spring of 2011 the world saw such rapid change. Tunisia led to 
Egypt, Egypt pushed Libya. Within a matter of months each of these countries witnessed 
the overthrow of decades-old oppressive regimes. However, the struggle for freedom and 
stability is far from over for the revolutionaries of the Arab Awakening. Just as the story 
after a revolution does not end with a regime’s overthrow, the story before the revolution 
does not begin with an explosive moment. Resistance often stretches far into the hidden
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past of an oppressed people. Can you imagine thirty-five years of resistance? Not thirty- 
five years of resistance under the cold-calm of a solitary dictator, but thirty-five years of 
constant invasion and endless war—a struggle against foreign occupations, civil war, 
warlords, and religious, cultural, and political oppression. This has been the revolution of 
the Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan (RAWA).1
In what follows, I examine what has allowed RAWA to survive as an organization 
for over thirty-five years in war-ravaged Afghanistan, Using James 0. Scott’s (1990) 
discursive theory, I explore how RAWA’s methods of resistance contribute to their 
continued existence. To fully understand RAWA’s resistance methodology I examine 
them over four time periods: 1) Soviet influence and occupation, 1977-1989; 2) Jehadi2 
civil war, 1989-1996; 3) Taliban era, 1996-2001; 4) U.S. invasion and Northern Alliance 
era, 2001-present. I argue that what has led to RAWA’s long and successful existence is 
their ability to shift when necessary, from highly visible forms of political action, such as 
protests, to more clandestine forms of political action, what Scott (1990) terms 
infrapolitics, embedded in RAWA’s humanitarian work. RAWA has also been skilled in 
using the means of their oppression—cultural norms or political and religious mandates, 
such as the burqa—to help disguise and simultaneously advance their work. Such highly 
developed resistance tactics build a strong case that the women of Afghanistan are 
sophisticated political activists, not merely “victims.”
*Like the women of RAWA, I will be referring to RAWA as a collective singular noun.
2 Because my analysis is a discursive one, keenly aware of the use of language, I will use terminology 
employed by RAWA to describe actors of Afghanistan’s recent history. Rather than describe the various 
fundamentalist factions fighting the Soviets as Mujahedeen (freedom fighters), I will called them Jehadi to 
express the negative connotation expressed by RAWA. I will also use RAWA’s translated spelling of 
Persian words.
Discourse Theory
The ontology of discourse theory is centered on power relations and the 
interactions between the dominant and subordinate groups of a society. It holds that the 
history and experiences of actors within a power-stratified society is foundational. 
Discourse theory does not simply assume that actors are rational, self-interested beings 
whose choices can be calculated like a math formula; it acknowledges that human beings 
are molded by their experience. One’s place in society—based on a myriad of factors 
such as gender, socio-economic status, religion, race, national origin, and beliefs—and 
how that place is viewed and treated by others has a significant impact on the choices 
made by individuals. Emotion, such as anger or hatred, can play a more significant role in 
a dissenter’s decision to lash out at the powers that be than calculated rationality and 
desires for self-gain. This is not to say that human nature, under the lens of discourse 
theory, is erratic and irrational, but that humans act in ways that are more complex than 
self-interested calculation including, for example, self-sacrifice. Further, discourse 
theory engages in interpretive epistemology. That is to say, discourse theory rejects the 
notion that there is an objective, grand theory of truth; rather truth is the subjective 
construction of one’s position in society and often the means of producing knowledge are 
controlled by those in power or a privileged position.
Another significant aspect of discourse theory is its emphasis language, hence the 
term “discourse.” The language that exists between a dominant group and a subordinate 
group—how it is constructed, by whom, for whom it is intended, and with what 
purpose—is a central component of the theory. In his theory, as articulated in 
Domination and the Arts o f Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (1990), Scott breaks down
the presentation of language and interaction between the dominant and subordinate into 
three categories: public, official, and the hidden. The public transcript is the public 
performance. Scott uses the image of a performance, complete with actors and stages 
throughout his work; thus the public transcript is what is said on the stage where actors 
from both the dominant and subordinate groups interact. As Scott points out, the public 
transcript can be quite misleading because the dominant and subordinate groups are 
literally acting and the play is the reaffirmation of the dominant group’s power. If one 
were to base her entire understanding of a society on the public transcript, one would 
believe that the dominant group held their higher position with, ease and little resistance 
from, and perhaps even the support of, the subordinate group. While this is clearly not 
the case, as will be explained, one would believe such a farce due to the highly ritualized 
interactions that take place between the two groups in public. There each group upholds 
the “role” assigned to them by the current power structure: the subordinates will be meek, 
humble, and respectful in the presence of the dominant group; the dominant in turn will 
exercise their status by receiving the respect of the subordinates, and if they deem 
necessary, administering punishment for insubordination. Within the public transcript 
both groups “tacitly conspire in misrepresentation” (Scott, 1990, p. 2). The subordinates 
disguise their true feelings toward the dominant out of necessity for survival and the 
dominant group members put on a show of power to keep that power intact.
There are numerous techniques used by the dominant group to keep up the 
interaction displayed in the public transcript. The method of concealment is the use of 
deception and propaganda to maintain control of the public transcript and to “conceal” 
anything that would distract from the image of their authority (Scott, 1990, p. 50).
Similarly, there is an effort by the dominant group members to create an appearance of 
unanimity among their ranks. The aim of unanimity is to keep any dispute or splintering 
among the elite away from the public stage, lest the subordinates pick up on such 
weakness and take advantage of it (Scott, 1990, p. 55). Finally, the dominant group 
members will distort the public discourse to their advantage with the use of euphemism 
and stigma. As Scott puts it, “whenever one encounters euphemism in language it is a 
nearly infallible sign that one has stumbled on a delicate subject” (Scott, 1990, p, 53),
The subjugation of one group by another is undoubtedly a delicate subject; therefore the 
dominant group will use terms such as “pacification” to describe a brutal armed attack, 
“liberation” for an unwelcome occupation, “collateral damage” to explain the death of 
innocents, and “honor” to justify horrendous actions. Stigma, on the other hand, is the 
exact opposite. With stigmatization the dominant group members can label threats to 
their power—threats that may be considered justified by a suppressed group—as negative 
and unfavorable (Scott, 1990, p. 55). The common cliche is “one man’s freedom fighter 
is another man’s terrorist.” Unfortunately, false portrayals such as euphemisms and 
stigmas are written into history as truth via the official transcript. The official transcript 
is the lasting legacy of the public transcript as produced by the dominant group. Often it 
is portrayed through public events, historical documentation and archives, which have 
generally been run, written and kept by the dominant. Focusing only on the official 
transcript provides one with seemingly convincing evidence, “of willing, even 
enthusiastic complicity” by the subordinate group (Scott, 1990, p. 86).
What both the public and official transcripts obscure is the discourse of 
subordinates that takes place “off-stage” away from the dominant group. This discourse
is known as the hidden transcript. The hidden transcript includes spoken language, 
action, and practices that take place off of the public stage. It is within the hidden 
transcript of the subordinate group that a negation of the dominant ideology can be 
articulated and patterns of resistance formulated (Scott, 1990, pp. 118-119). Scott points 
out that “the essential point is that a resistant subculture.. .among subordinates is 
necessarily a product of mutuality” (1990, p. 119). That is, when individuals feel anger 
at the dominant group, it is the hidden transcript that takes this “raw” anger and through 
shared experiences, mutual feelings and discussions of a possible new order forms it into 
the “cooked” indignation of the subordinates as a whole (or at least a faction of them). It 
is the hidden transcript, “the discursive practices offstage [that] sustain resistance” (Scott, 
1990, p. 191, original emphasis).
Articulation within any transcript occurs in what Scott terms the social site. The 
social sites of the hidden transcript of the subordinates are those locations where 
“unspoken riposte, stifled anger, and bitten tongues created by relations of domination 
find. ..full throated expression”; it follows that the hidden transcript will be least hindered 
when the “control, surveillance and repression of the dominant are unable to reach” 
(Scott, 1990, p. 120). There are also a range of social sites depending on how closely a 
certain site is monitored by the dominant. For example, a secure social site for the hidden 
transcript may not involve any physical separation at all when linguistic codes, gestures 
and disguises are employed (Scott, 1990, p. 121). Finally, Scott emphasizes that social 
sites themselves are an “achievement of resistance; they are won and defended in the 
teeth of power” (Scott, 1990, p. 119).
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While the hidden transcript is “produced for a different audience and under 
different constraints” than the public transcript, there are times when, as a display of 
resistance, the subordinate groups finds ways to interject the hidden discourse onto the 
public stage (Scott, 1990, p. 140). It is fear of retaliation that restrains the subordinate 
group from openly expressing the hidden transcript on the public stage, yet “if it is 
possible to declare the hidden transcript while disguising the identity of the person 
declaring it, then much of the fear is dissipated” (Scott, 1990, p. 140). Two key methods 
of doing this are to disguise the message or the messenger. The former case is when the 
subordinate relaying the message is identifiable, but the message or insubordinate act is 
ambiguous; the latter case is when the act itself is explicit, but the actor is disguised. 
Furthermore, disguise can be accomplished in the form of anonymity. One crucial form 
of anonymity is mass defiance; mobs or crowds are another way of disguising the 
individual to produce anonymity (Scott, 1990, p. 150). It is important to note that the 
degree of disguise adorned by the subordinates “to make a successful intrusion into the 
public transcript will probably increase if the political environment is very threatening 
and very arbitrary” (Scott, 1990, p. 139). This quasi-public display of ideological 
resistance by subordinates is “disguised, muted and veiled for safety’s sake”; by 
recognizing these guises “that the powerless must adopt outside of the safety of the 
hidden transcript, scholars can, discern a political dialogue with power in the public 
transcript” (Scott, 1990, pp. 137*138).
The concepts of disguised messages, messengers and anonymity are tied to 
Scott’s concept of infrapolitics. Infrapolitics is political resistance that, “like infrared rays 
[is]... invisible... [and is] a tactical choice born of a prudent awareness of the balance of
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power” (Scott, 1990, p. 183). Infrapolitics emerge out of necessity—when open 
resistance would be swiftly and brutally subdued, jeopardizing the entire resistance 
movement. Infrapolitical acts would be considered by contemporary liberal democracies 
to be apolitical (see analysis in Sparks, 1997). In the liberal democratic paradigm, the 
term “political” refers to open and public acts from voting and campaigning to protest 
and rallies. However, under repressive regimes, such open political action is rarely a 
viable option. Liberal democratic theories assume that subordinate groups have political 
rights and channel through which to express grievances.
Infrapolitics is a strategy well suited to those without political rights. Under 
tyrannical regimes infrapolitics is political life. According to Scott, “before the recent 
development of institutionalized democratic norms, [the] ambiguous realm of political 
conflict was... the site of political discourse” (Scott, 1990, p. 200). Furthermore, as Scott 
notes “in many respects [infrapolitics] is conducted in more earnest, for higher stakes, 
and against greater odds than political life in liberal democracies” (Scott, 1990, p. 200).
In addition, Scott observes that infrapolitics “extends to.. .organization” as well as to its 
substantive actions. The “elementary [organization].. .of infrapolitics have an alternative, 
innocent existence” that lends to their disguise, such as informal networks of kin, 
neighbors, friends, communities (Scott, 1990, p. 200).
Scott makes it clear that behind every undisguised, open display of resistance is a 
series of infrapolitical tactics that made open resistance possible. Infrapolitics are the 
tactics that keep the hidden transcript alive; it is the political “twin-sister” to open 
resistance, “who shares the same goals, but whose low-profile is better adapted to 
resisting an opponent who could probably win any open confrontation” (Scott, 1990, p.
184). It keeps up a hidden spirit of resistance and dismisses any notion that the 
subordinate group accepts the propaganda of their subordination; rather infrapolitics 
demonstrates that subordinates are prudently surviving and biding their time until the 
moment is right for open resistance.
Methods
In my examination RAWA’s infrapolitical tactics, I have employed a case study 
methodology. I selected this method to allow for an in-depth examination of the public, 
official and hidden transcripts of both the subordinate group (i.e., RAW A) and dominant 
groups (i.e., the Soviets, Jehadis, Taliban, and the U.S.) involved in the discourse 
surrounding RAWA, In efforts to be as true to the discourse as possible, I have made an 
effort to rely on primary evidence as much as possible,
In the age of the internet, gathering evidence on RAWA’s hidden transcript took 
me beyond Scott’s definition of the hidden transcript. Much of the RAWA’s discourse is 
expressed as news stories, publications, photographs, songs, poems, mission statements, 
etc. and is archived on the website (rawa.org). In addition to RAWA’s website, I 
gathered secondary evidence from two books published on RAWA, all of which contain 
in-depth interviews: With All of Our Strength, by Anne E. Brodsky (2003) and Meena: 
Heroine of Afghanistan, by Melody E. Chavis (2003). Evidence of RAWA’s public and 
official transcripts came from newspaper articles, interviews, quotes, official statements 
released by the group, and, when possible, recorded dialogue between RAWA and a 
dominant group.
Evidence for the four dominant groups came in various forms and ranged from 
non-existent to overwhelming. With these groups, I focus primarily on their public and
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official transcripts to try to understand their outward reactions to RAWA and RAWA’s 
response to such action. Unfortunately, without access to Russian-language archives, 
finding official or publics transcripts of the Soviets proved to be nearly impossible. As 
they never formed a long-lasting cohesive body, official transcripts for the Jehadi factions 
is lacking, yet quotes from individual leaders and newspaper articles were readily 
available. For the official transcripts of the Taliban and U.S., I relied on their websites 
(the official website of the Taliban, who recognize themselves as the Islamic Emirate of 
Afghanistan, shahamat-english.com, and the U.S. State Department’s website, state.gov). 
And for public transcripts surround these two dominant groups I drew from the upsurge 
of news stories, scholarly articles, and interviews beginning in 2000 through today.
Background
Although Afghanistan’s history spans thousands of years, for the study of RAWA 
it is sufficient to begin in the late 1970s. It was in 1977 that a bright, young university 
student Meena Keshwa Kamal3, along with several other students, founded the 
Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan (RAWA)—the first women- 
run, women-oriented organization in Afghan history. At the time the “sole purpose and 
aim [of RAWA] was the advancement and equality of Afghan women” (Brodsky, 2003, 
p. 43). Their primary method to achieve their goals was women’s education. While 
some Afghan women at this time had access to education, particularly urban elites like 
the women who founded RAWA, Shaima, a senior member4 of RAWA explains why 
their mission was “revolutionary”:
3 Keshwa Kamal was an Indian pseudonym used by Meena to travel aboard more easily. Her real last name 
is kept secret for security reasons.
4 The term “senior member” is used to refer to a woman who has been with RAWA since its earliest days, 
rather than age or position within the organization.
At the time [in 1977] women’s education was not revolutionary in the 
sense that [it was] during the Taliban.. .But we always thought deeper than 
just giving women education. We thought the purpose was giving women 
a consciousness—political, social, cultural—giving them that 
consciousness meant a revolution. (Brodsky, 2003, p. 106)
As turmoil mounted within Afghanistan, and factions vying for control in 1978
eventually led to the Soviet invasion and occupation on December 28,1979, RAWA
realized it could not ignore the gravity of these events. “RAWA believed that the struggle
for women’s rights could not be separated from national liberation,” stated Shaima
(Brodsky, 2003, p. 53). If women’s liberation was to be achieved, RAWA wanted it to
arise from the people through education and an expanded consciousness, not by force
through foreign regimes. Thus RAWA added the cause of national liberation to their
agenda. Knowing that left-wing communists in Afghanistan only paid lip service to the
cause of women’s liberation and that right-wing religious fundamentalists would do
anything to suppress women, RAWA also took up the causes of democracy and
secularism.
On February 4,1987, RAWA was hit with what would be their greatest test of 
strength and endurance: their beloved leader, Meena, had disappeared. It was soon 
discovered that Meena, along with her two body guards, had been assassinated. Reports 
of who is responsible for the murders vary, but RAWA itself notes, Meena was 
assassinated “by Afghan agents of the then KGB in connivance with [the] fundamentalist 
band of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar” (“About RAWA”, n.d.). It is difficult to concisely 
articulate what Meena meant to the women of RAWA. For many members and 
supporters, who live in self-imposed austerity so resources could be given to RAWA, the 
only item “that interrupted the starkness of [their] rooms” was an image of Meena
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(Brodsky, 2003, p. 27). In reading the few books written on RAWA or their website, it
has become apparent to me that Meena’s genuine compassion for those she worked for,
her passion, endurance, and unwavering commitment inspired many to join and support
RAWA. Without her, it would be difficult to continue. Yet, realizing that without
RAWA there would be no nonviolent, democratic voice to oppose the Soviets and
fundamentalists, the women “carrfied] on with the ideals [Meena died for]” (Chavis,
2003, p. 157).
RAWA’s Principles
These ideals for which Meena was martyred, include, freedom, secular
democracy, and social justice (i.e., women’s rights and human rights). I find it best
articulate these principles in RAWA’s own words:
By FREEDOM we mean political, economic and cultural freedom and 
independence for our country. By FREEDOM we also mean the right to 
individual freedoms of expression, belief, congregation, profession and 
travel, etc.; freedom of the press, freedom to form political parties and 
unions, freedom to elect and be elected, and all such other inalienable 
rights of citizens. The FREEDOM that we demands implies a total halt to 
all forms of inquisitory policing of thought, freedom of terror and torture, 
and guarantees for the safeguarding of the human dignity of individuals.
We further believe that in the context of fundamentalism-ridden 
Afghanistan, in order to attain the above mentioned freedoms it is first and 
foremost necessary to put forward the demand for DEMOCRACY, the 
prime condition for which is secularism, (i.e. the separation of religion 
from the State). It is only in a secular State where there can be talk of the 
above mentioned freedoms. All the above freedoms are infringed upon 
under the pretext of religious injunctions. According to our understanding, 
it is only under DEMOCRACY that the religious beliefs of the people 
retain their pristine spiritual value and are not unscrupulously abused to 
further political ends, and human rights—including freedom of religious 
belief—can be guaranteed and safeguarded. We believe that conventional 
democratic political institutions in the absence of SOCIAL JUSTICE are 
flawed and worthless. We can talk of democracy and democratic 
institutions in Afghanistan only when the agrarian issue is resolved in the 
interests of peasants who comprise the absolute majority of the people and 
factors perpetuating the distance between the rich and the poor are done
13
away with. Democracy can take roots only when the means for work and 
gaining an honest livelihood are available for all and are not under the 
dominance of or in the monopoly of the few; where there is religious 
freedom; where there is no national or ethnic oppression of minorities, and 
where the human rights of women as half of the societal corpus are 
respected. Such are the pillars of SOCIAL JUSTICE, without which 
democracy would ring hollow.
(“About RAWA”, n.d., original emphasis)
Organizational Structure
RAWA’s sophisticated organization style—democratic, non-hierarchical, and
collectively based—contributes to their ability not only to preach, but to practice these
aforementioned principles. It may be asked who can speak on behalf of Afghan women?
There has certainly been criticism of RAWA for attempting to do so, yet RAWA’s
membership policy makes them quite representative of Afghan women. RAWA only
allows Afghan women to be full-fledged members,3 all others who are interested in
helping—men and foreigners—are known as supporters and have limited access to
RAWA. RAWA’s membership is also unhindered by education, wealth, location or
ethnic identity.6 Although they do not put great emphasis on exact numbers, it is
estimated that RAWA is made up of approximately 2,000 members.
RAWA has seven standing committees; three of these operate in both Pakistan
and Afghanistan: education, social (humanitarian), and finance. Hie three more
outwardly-oriented committees operate only in Pakistan: publications, foreign affairs and
culture. The only committee that operates solely in Afghanistan is the reports committee,
which is responsible for taking videos and photography and writing reports of the crimes
5 “Every -freedom-loving and honorable compatriot women or girl who has reached the age of 17 can 
become a member of RAWA by accepting its aims and duties and it organizational regulations and 
implementing them in practice” (Brodsky, 2002, p. 174).
6 While RAWA was founded by university educated women from Kabul, now women from any 
background can become a member and severe in a variety of committee and leadership positions.
against humanity committed by the fundamentalists. RAWA also has a Leadership 
Council made up of eleven women who are elected every two years with write in ballots 
submitted by the rest of the membership; the goal was to create a leadership structure that 
was democratic, collective and as non-hierarchical (Brodsky, 2003). The Leadership 
Council meets periodically throughout the year (in meeting whose time and location are 
only known to the eleven members) and communicates via letters, phone calls and email 
the rest of the time. Their main responsibilities include: overseeing the operation of 
activities and to write the organization’s standpoints, and political and social policy 
statements, with input from all the members (Brodsky, 2003 pp. 151-159).
For four decades RAWA has been a constant voice for social justice, democracy, 
secularism, and women’s rights, They have endured what few equally long-lasting 
organizations have—continual war, two foreign invasions, and severe cultural, religious 
and political restrictions. As my research will show, such endurance is not a product of 
mere luck or foreign saviors; it is result of a sophisticated organizational structure and the 
ability to adapt their resistance strategy to which ever regime hold power.
Oppression and Resistance
In this section 1 explore the type of restrictions RAWA faced during each of the 
four time periods: Soviet influence and occupation, Jehadi civil war, Taliban rule and 
U.S. invasion and Northern Alliance rule. I show the various tactics used by the 
dominant groups to maintain control of the public transcript as well as their grasp on 
power. Most importantly, I examine RAWA’s shifting infrapolitics in action; that is, how 
their tactics shifted from highly visible and outward resistance to clandestine, seemingly
apolitical resistance within and across all four time periods. As discussed in the methods
section, I do not have the same amount of information for each historical period.
Soviet Influence and Occupation (1977-1989)
...because o f its people I  love my country 
My people who will rise up to join in protest 
Even after their cities run red with blood and fire...
Meena, “The Great Love”, date unknown
Before the Moscow-directed coup d’etat of April 1978, RAWA’s activities were 
confined to struggle for women’s rights and democracy (“About RAWA”, n.d.). In this 
way, RAWA had positioned themselves outside of the dominant left-ri ght ideological 
debate raging in Afghanistan. As one male RAWA supporter stated, “there was a higher 
share of women in the left, but the left was all ideological goals and women’s rights were 
instrumental, not an aim. Meanwhile, on the right, women had no place worth 
mentioning” besides having their honor and dignity “protected” and being ushered away 
from school and employment back to the home (as quoted in Brodsky, 2003, p. 43). As 
Mohmand (2012) argues, the Afghan women were treated instrumentally during this 
period but both sides. In advocating for women’s rights and democracy, RAWA realized 
that they would receive hostility from both the left-wing communists and right-wing 
fundamentalists.
RAWA’s early activities, from 1977 until 1979, were minimal and “under the 
radar.” Small, clandestine groups of women organized by Meena met to discuss the 
organization’s principles and to think of ways in which they could aid all women, but 
especially the poor women, of Afghanistan. They began by holding, small, secret literacy 
classes for illiterate women they knew. At this point, information about RAWA was 
mainly spread by word of mouth. Soon they began to distribute fliers called Shabnameh,
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night letters, which were not meant for recruitment* but to spread opposition against the 
corrupt regime. RAWA had yet to organize openly—there was never a time in 
Afghanistan that they felt safe to do so. Thus women met in communal bath houses and 
wore the burqa, despite being modem women who did not normally veil themselves,7 in 
order to protect their identity. All of these aforementioned tactics—small, seemingly 
informal and innocent gatherings; the anonymous distribution of the Shabnameh; wearing 
burqas; information spread by word of mouth, and literacy classes—all demonstrate 
sophisticated infrapolitics. RAWA employed these disguise tactics to be able to 
physically move themselves as well as their hidden transcript through an increasingly 
hostile public arena.
From April 1978, when pro-Soviet Union Khalq party staged a coup against 
government, to December 1979, when the Soviets invaded, thousands of people, 
particularly men, intellectuals, and those associated with opposition groups were jailed, 
tortured and killed. Several members of RAWA were imprisoned and tortured, some up 
to eight years. “After the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in December 1979, RAWA 
became directly involved in the war o f resistance” (“About RAWA”, n.d., original 
emphasis), RAWA’s involvement in the resistance early on included open resistance, 
such as marching in student lead protests in Kabul. However, even the act of openly 
demonstrating was conducted with some level of infrapolitics. RAWA employed the 
tactic of disguise, by not directly organizing the demonstrations and by not identifying 
themselves as RA WA members; thus, they became anonymous women in a crowd of 
many. RAWA also directly supported certain factions of mujahedeen by smuggling
The veil was m ade optional in 1959 by King Zahir (Chavis, 2003, p. 195).
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weapons, aiding fighters on the front line and, in accordance with their original mission, 
teaching literacy classes to women on the front line as well (Brodsky, 2003, pp. 60-63).
In 1981, RAWA began its influential publication Pctyam-e Zan (Women’s 
Message). Payam-e Zan documented the atrocities of the Soviet regime and the 
fundamentalists, published inspirational poems, political essays, declared RAWA’s 
stance on issues, and reported on the overall condition of Afghanistan and Afghan 
women. The magazine also acted as an educational tool through which literacy classes 
and political awareness were cultivated and was an important vehicle for recruitment 
(Brodsky, 2003).
Due to a worsening security situation—threats, disappearance, arrests, torture—in 
198land 1982 many RAWA members, including Meena, fled across the border to 
Pakistan to better continue their operations. By the time they arrived nearly 2 million 
Afghan refugees had already fled to Pakistan. RAWA eventually settled in the border 
town of Quetta, In Quetta, RAWA began engaging in more seemingly “apolitical” 
resistance tactics. RAWA become engaged in what outwardly appeared to be solely 
humanitarian projects such as a handcraft center that provided vocational training for 
women and in 1984, two large boarding schools, Watan (homeland) schools and in 1986 
the Malalai Hospital all of which served the Afghan refugee population. RAWA’s 
smaller projects in Afghanistan, mobile health clinics and small scale income generating 
projects are clearly infrapolitical. These projects aimed to give women a political and 
cultural consciousness and sustained hope in the resistance effort. After Meena* s death
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was made public in August of 1987, RAWA once again began to hold public
demonstrations in Pakistan protesting the atrocities in Afghanistan8 (Brodsky, 2003).
Jehadi Civil War (1989-1996^
Sister, rise up after your freedom,
Why are you quiet? Rise up because henceforth 
you have to imbibe the blood of tyrannical men
Forugh Farrokhzad, “To My Sister”, date unknown
Upon the 1989 departure of the Soviet Union power was given to a Soviet backed 
puppet regime and the Jehadi continued their struggle to take control of the country. On 
April 28,1992—a day that RAWA refers to as the “Black Day”—the Jehadi factions 
took control of Kabul. For the next four years the fundamentalist factions fought each 
other for political control, igniting a civil war. It was during this time “when many 
stopped referring to these fighters and party leaders as Mujahedeen, freedom fighters, but 
instead called them Jehadi and warlords” (Brodsky, 2003, p. 99). From 1992-1996 it is 
estimated that at least 50,000 people were killed and 100,000 wounded in Kabul alone, 
over half of the city was destroyed, people throughout the country were subjected to 
robbery, kidnapping, murder and rape (Brodsky, 2003; “Info on Afghanistan”, n.d.).
The reports collected from RAWA from 1992 up through the Taliban era are 
thorough, graphic and well documented on their website. While “the Jehadis did not 
officially ban women from school, work or leaving their houses alone.. .their lawlessness 
and criminality had the same result” (Brodsky, 2003, p. 100). The robbery, kidnappings, 
murders, rapes committed by various Jehadi groups—whether in control of a particular 
region or fighting to control it—forced the Afghan people to resort to begging or selling
8 These included February 4, the day of Meena’s death; March 8, International Women’s Day; April 28, 
“Black Day” the day the Jehadis began bombing Kabul in 1992; December 10, International Human Rights 
Day; and December 28, the day the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. All events are held annually when 
possible (“Some RAWA Past Events”, n.d.).
off their children to those better able to support them. Many women, who had lost all of 
their male relatives, were left with the option of prostituting themselves or allowing their 
children to starve, and young girls, many of whom were raped by Jehadi forces, 
committed suicide to maintain their and their family’s honor (“Archived Reports”, n.d.; 
Mohmand, 2012).
While they were the dominant group in Afghanistan, the Jehadi factions utilized 
numerous tactics described by Scott to keep a hold of their power. Concealment was used 
when hiding their atrocious treatment of women. If the Jehadis took responsibility for 
rapes, kidnappings, and random murders they committed, their claim to legitimacy 
through Islamic fundamentalism—which upholds the honor of women—would be in 
question. Even years after their rule, Jehadi factions (i.e., the Northern Alliance) who are 
now attempting to take power under the current U.S. established government, attempt to 
uphold their image through concealment and denial of their past wrong doings 
(Congressional Committee on International Relations, 2001). In addition, other abhorrent 
acts committed by the Jehadis, such as the destruction of Kabul, were euphemized with 
terms such as “freedom fighting.”
Furthermore, stigmatization of RAWA was a frequently used by Jehadi factions. 
Whereas the Soviets targeted RAWA simply for being a resistance organization, the 
Jehadi factions found numerous ways to explicitly attack RAWA’s credibility and 
reputation. There is a misconception, even today, among many Afghans (and even critics 
in the West), that RAWA is somehow left-of-center or even communist (see, analyses in, 
Thurpkaew, 2002; Burqa Resistance, 2001 in RAWA in the World Media, 2002 p. 157). 
At the height of the war of resistance, there appeared to be only two choices for Afghans:
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pro-Soviet communist or pro -Muj ahedeen, implying the latter equated with being pro- 
Afghanistan. Since RAWA resisted the notion of fundamentalist Islam espoused by the
Jehadis....who for a time were viewed as freedom fighters—they were often branded as
pro-Soviet. Another reason for this branding was Meena’s husband* Dr. Faiz Ahmed, 
who founded and worked with an alternative, leftist resistance organization. One RAWA 
member noted: “The world over women are painted with their husband’s opinions” 
(Chavis,2003, p. 90). It was difficult for many regular Afghans to believe that a husband 
and wife could hold differing political opinions and work for different organizations 
which had separate activities and aims. This difference was easily exploited by RAWA’s 
enemies.
Furthermore, many of the rumors against RAWA arose out sexism. It was 
impossible for many Afghans to believe that women, without the guidance and patronage 
of men, could organize and sustain such a strong resistance movement. Other women’s 
organizations that existed during the Soviet era were off-shoots of already established 
men’s organizations;9 thus a women’s organization like RAWA was doomed to be 
misconstrued as the underlings of other various male-run organizations, whether 
communist, fundamentalist, or Western.
An incident in Pakistan, in December of 2000, where fighting broke out between 
RAWA and other women demonstrators and a Jehadi faction, highlights the vast array of 
contradictory stigmas placed on RAWA, The following are several headlines and quotes 
from articles that covered the incident:
9 For example, the Democratic Organization of Afghan Women (DOAW), arguably one of the first 
women’s organizations in Afghanistan, was founded in 1965; yet it was not an independent organization 
like RAWA. DOAW was a branch of the communist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA).
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• “the violent supporters of RAWA ransacked the camps of the Jehadi 
organizations...”
• “RAWA Denies Backing Opposition Against Taliban: .. .RAWA defended 
itself against accusations that is was supporting the opposition Northern 
Alliance...”
• “Attempting to demolish the Kashmir Freedom Movement, the 
fundraising camp for Jehadis was set on fire and the Holy Qura’n was 
destroyed.. .Thousands of women and children staged [the] rally.. .the 
attackers were reported to be supporters of the Northern Alliance”
• “Violence by Westernized Women in Capital”
• “Demonstrators were the agents of the US”
(RAWA, 2000)
The shift in regime led to a shift in RAWA’s infrapolitical tactics and mission.
“After the fall of the puppet government and the invasion of the fundamentalists bands
into Kabul, RAWA focused more., *on women’s rights, human rights and exposition of
the fundamentalists barbaric actions” (“ Social Activities”, n.d.). RAWA describes their
activities in Afghanistan (during the Jehadi rule, as well as today) in these terms:
Our work inside Afghanistan consists mainly of support to female victims 
of war and atrocities committed by belligerent groups. Our workers 
contact families and particularly women who either themselves or their 
family members have been victimized by the fundamentalists.
Highlighting their misadventures via reports published in Women's 
Message [Payam-e Zari], alerting international sentinels of human rights 
such as Amnesty International and similar organizations to human rights 
violations against women. (“Social Activities”, n.d.)
During this time RAWA retreated away from the more open resistance, such as 
demonstrations, they employed for a time under the Soviet occupation, and began to use 
infrapolitical methods in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. This shift back to small scale, 
humanitarian projects was also promoted by a lack of resources. After the Soviets had 
left “international sources of funding for Afghan refugees shrunk until RAWA could no 
longer even sustain the cost of Malalai Hospital...RAWA shifted its medical aid back to 
small clinics” (Chavis, 2003, p. 161). In Afghanistan small, often mobile clinics were
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founded and clandestine literature courses for women were taught by RAWA members.
In Pakistan RAWA continued to help Afghan refugees by setting up schools and medical 
clinics. RAWA also continued the struggle of education. They tried to attracted and 
teach as many young orphans as possible, yet RAWA was competing against well-funded 
fundamentalist madrassas, which instilled in young boys the principles of fundamentalist 
Islam (Chavis, 2003). The evidence suggests that this time RAWA kept a low profile in 
Afghanistan. There is very little written in any of the books about RAWA and on 
RAWA’s own website about their activities during this time.
Taliban (1996-2001)
They made me invisible, shrouded and non-being 
A shadow, no existence, made silent and unseeing 
Denied of freedom, confined to my cage 
Tell me how to handle my anger and my rage?
Zieba Shorish-Shamley, “Look into My World”, 1998
By 1996, the Taliban, “a movement made up of Afghan madrassa,
[fundamentalist Islamic schools in Pakistan], students., .under the control of Mullah 
Mohammad Omar” took control of Kabul and brought an end to the worst of the Jehadi 
fighting (Brodsky, 2003, p. 101). However, a hell-like reality persisted for the Afghan 
people under the rule of the Taliban; instead of all-out war waged through rockets and 
landmines, war was carried out through the implementation of ultra-fundamental i st 
interpretations of Islamic law. Restrictions against women included being forced to wear 
the burqa in public and being barred from leaving the home without a mahram (close 
male relative), working, attending school, going to the hospital or interacting with men 
who were not close relatives. The inhumane crimes committed against women, children 
and men included “harsh and unpredictable physical punishment” for breaking any of the
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aforementioned edicts, and the continued kidnapping, raping and murdering women at
will (Brodsky, 2003, p. 101).
The Taliban, like their Jehadi predecessors engaged in numerous techniques
described by Scott to retain their control over much of Afghanistan. The following are
euphemistic quotes from various Taliban officials gathered by the U.S. Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (2001b):
It’s like having a flower, or a rose. You water it and keep it at home for 
yourself to look at it and smell it It [a woman] is not supposed to be 
taken out o f the house to be smelled.
Syed Ghaisuddin, Taliban Minister of Education, when asked why women 
needed to be confined at home, 2001
I f  we are to ask Afghan women> their problems have been solved.
Qudratullah Jamal, Taliban Minister of Culture, 2001
We have enough problems with the education o f men, and in those affairs 
no one asks us about that
Qari Mullah Din Muhammad Hanif, Taliban Minister of Higher 
Education, 2001
I f a woman wants to work away from her home and with men, then that is 
not allowed by our religion and our culture. I f  we force them to do this 
they may want to commit suicide.
Mullah Nooruddin Turabi, Taliban Minister of Justice, 2001
We do not have any immediate plans to give jobs to (women) who have 
been laid off, But they can find themselves jobs enjoying their free lives.
Moulvi Wakil Ahmad Mutawakel, Taliban Minister of Foreign Affairs,
2001
Despite their outwardly harsh treatment of women and their euphemistic talking 
points early on, today the Taliban has seemed to opt for concealment of their former 
treatment of women and restrictions on women’s rights as well. In the entirety of the 
Taliban’s website (on which they refer to themselves the Islamic Emirate of 
Afghanistan), there is only one article on women, yet it does not declare the Taliban’s
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views on women, but, instead, critiques the U.S. government’s bombing of women and
children (Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, 2011). Their silence on their views on and past
treatment of women is a telling one. They are concealing their views and treatment of
women, which they know to be considered harsh even among Afghans, to show
themselves in a more favorable light—at least as better than the US.
The Taliban also continued the Jehadi tactic of stigmatizing RAWA, as well as
oppressing them through euphemized Islamic justice, In reference to the previously
mentioned December 2000 demonstration in Pakistan, the Taliban’s secretary of the
Afghan Embassy in Pakistan, Habibullah, was quoted as saying that RAWA was an agent
of the Indian intelligence, that RAWA was at the same time supported by Northern
Alliance leader Ahmed Shah Masood and that RAWA was also paid by foreigners to
chant anti-Taliban slogans. He also went on to say that the Taliban regime had “given all
the rights to women in the light of Islam” (as quoted in RAWA, 2000, p. 59).
In response to the Taliban take-over of Kabul RAWA stated:
“under Taliban control, even if the number of rapes and murders 
perpetrated against women falls, Taliban restrictions—comparable to 
those from the middle ages—will continue to kill the spirit of our people 
while depriving them of a humane existence. We consider Taliban more 
treacherous and ignorant than Jehadis. According to our people,4 Jehadis 
were killing us with guns and swords but Taliban are killing us with 
cotton.’” (“Afghan Women”, n.d.)
Under the Taliban, RAWA’s mission did not drastically change from when the 
Jehadis were vying for power: “the focus of RAWA’s political struggle has been against 
the fundamentalists’ and the ultra-fundamentalist Taliban’s criminal policies and 
atrocities against the people of Afghanistan in general and their incredibly ultra-male- 
chauvinistic and anti-woman orientation in particular” (“Info on Afghanistan”, n.d,).
Likely, while their mission remained the same, their tactics had to retreat further into the
infrapolitics. While the Jehadis would boast about the high employment of women
during their rule, giving the de facto impression that women were free to move about and
attend work, schools and hospitals, the Taliban did not tolerate women’s free movement.
A woman outside the home automatically garnered unwanted attention. RAWA’s tasks
became even more difficult under such repression. Yet, RAWA did not stop sending
educated women back into Afghanistan to continue their work in schools and medical
clinics, as well as to continue their own education. When asked why RAWA sent women
to Afghanistan from Pakistan, one student replied,
For the experience of living in Afghanistan. To known the real pain and 
suffering. So we could experience the underground life under the 
Taliban...RAWA thought I could teach, take RAWA’s message to 
classes.. .It was good and useful because I could study and I was able to 
teach others. (Brodsky, 2003, p. 148)
Disguise of their identities and activities was crucial at this time. As Brodsky notes, in
Afghanistan it was crucial that most people not know that a school was run by RAWA.
As another RAWA member noted, “If the Taliban caught me inside Afghanistan they
would definitely torture and kill me, stone me as a quote-unquote prostitute” (Pollitt,
2000). The threat of physical harm, and stigmatization in addition, made infrapolitical
tactics not only prudent, but necessary. However, it should be noted, that fear was not
what made RAWA members act “under the radar”; the same RAWA member continued
by stating, “But I can do it. Pm ready for anything. Someday we will die but maybe it
will be a prouder death than from some natural cause” (Pollitt, 2000).
The bravery of RAWA members was also exemplified, just as it was during the
Jehadi civil war, by their clandestine reporting and documentation of the brutal crimes
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and punishment carried out against the Afghan people. In 2001, a BBC documentary,
Beneath the Veil, aired footage of the 1999 public execution of Zarmeena, a mother of
seven who had been accused of killing her husband. This footage, which was seen by
millions of people around the world, was secretly filmed by RAWA, with the knowledge
that if they were caught, they too would be executed (Brodsky, 2003, p. 14).
Finally, one year into the Taliban rule, RAWA initiated one of their most crucial
infrapolitical projects, “In the context of a regime that sought to take Afghanistan back
centuries in time, RAWA moved technologically in the other direction, creating a website
and gaining access to email, and thus nearly instantaneous contact with the rest of the
world, for the first time” (Brodsky, 2003, p. 101). RAWA’s website has proven to be one
of their most innovative and useful social sites.
U.S. Occupation and the Northern Alliance (2001-Present>
My country resists the invaders who bring their own ruin!
My country is tired of injustice and will sallow no more!
My country will never surrender to occupation/
Meena, “The Great Love”, date unknown
When the air raids on Afghanistan began in October 2001, the Western world
believed the U.S. and its allies were going to bring peace, democracy and, of course,
women's rights to Afghanistan. In November 2001, U.S. stated:
The United States Government, which has been the largest individual 
national donor to Afghan humanitarian assistance efforts, believes the 
Taliban's oppression of women must come to an end. The U.S.
Government supports a broad-based government representative of all the 
Afghan people and which includes women in post-Taliban Afghanistan.
Only Afghans can determine the future government of their country. And 
Afghan women should have the opportunity to play a role in that future.
(Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 2001a)
Furthermore, in the same month, First Lady Laura Bush claimed the U.S.-led 
intervention led to the emancipation of Afghan women: “a world-wide effort to focus on 
the brutality against women and children by al-Qaeda terrorist and the regime that 
supports it in Afghanistan, the Taliban.. .the fight against terrorism is also a fight for the 
rights and dignity of women” (as quoted in Mohmand, 2012). Both of these statements, 
one from the official transcript and one from the public, aim to give the impression that 
the U.S. is coming into Afghanistan, not only to fight terrorism, but to fight for and 
“liberate” Afghan women. Both of these statements condemn the Taliban government, 
yet they, as well as numerous other official and public transcripts articulated by the U.S. 
post-September 11th, fail to mention the U.S.’s support the equally ruthless Jehadi 
factions. There is a silence, a concealment, of the U.S.’s past role in bring Afghanistan to 
its current, war-ravaged state. Furthermore, the U.S.'s discourse surrounding Afghan 
women reeks of savior mentality. While there is talk of having Afghan women “play a 
role in [Afghanistan's] future” and the “rights and dignity of [Afghan] women”, there is 
little talk of partnering with existing women’s organizations and supporting them, rather 
than guiding their liberation.
It must also be acknowledged, that women’s issues are not separate from the 
decade long war waging in Afghanistan; if anything, the war—the civilian causalities, the 
displacement both within the country and those forced to flee—takes a greater toll on 
women then the lack of rights alone. Unfortunately, it is difficult to find exact, reliable 
numbers of Afghan civilian deaths and injuries caused by U.S. and allied attacks since the 
start of the occupation in 2001; this I do not believe is an accident, but one aspect of 
concealment on the part of the U.S.
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Despite the harsh conditions that many Afghan women still face, the U.S. is 
deploying domination tactics in efforts to conceal and euphemize the situation, and 
furthermore to stigmatize RAWA. As just noted, I was unable to find the number of 
Afghan civilian deaths from 2001 to the present; estimates span huge ranges, and vary 
greatly from source to source. In contrast, the number of U.S. troops killed, is readily 
available information: from October 7,2001 through May 14,2012 1,966 U.S. troops 
died in Afghanistan (Livingston & O’Hanlon, 2012). While some discrepancy is 
understandable, it appears there is an aspect of concealment on the part of the U.S. in not 
being able to provide somewhat coherent estimates of Afghan civilian casualties. Further 
evidence of concealment is found in the public transcript of the media. It is rare that 
incidents of a small numbers of Afghan causalities are reported in the U.S. mainstream 
media, beyond the off-hand mention of a car bomb in this province or that city. Yet, 
stories on RAWA’s streaming news feed (by far the most updated and well maintained 
portion of rawa.org) report daily incidents of civilian deaths, especially those due to U.S. 
and coalition air raids and other attacks; these same stories prove difficult to find in any 
U.S. news sources (see http://rawa.org/temp/runews/).
Furthermore, I would argue that within Scott’s notion of concealment is an aspect 
of dehumanization. By merely mentioning an incident and not the number of civilians 
killed, their names, or anything about their lives, the dominant power—the U.S. in this 
case—is attempting to not only conceal their wrong doing, but making the subordinates 
at home (i.e., U.S. civilians) less critical of their actions and thus maintaining a hold on 
their dominant position of power. For instance, not a single mainstream media news
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source in the U.S. mentioned the names of the 16 civilians massacred in March of this 
year by Staff Sergeant Robert Bales.10
The ways in which the U.S. has euphemized the war in Afghanistan are quite 
obvious. As in most wars of occupation, the terms “liberation”—as with women’s rights 
in Afghanistan, as previously mentioned—and “collateral damage”—when it comes to 
civilian deaths” are ubiquitous. While the U.S. has euphemized their efforts in 
Afghanistan, sources in the U.S. first began to stigmatize RAWA, once they made it 
known they would not automatically support an invading regime, and today the U.S. has 
silenced RAWA’s critical voice in mainstream media. From 2000, with the release of 
BBC’s Beneath the Veil, through September 11,2011, which turned the world’s gaze on 
Afghanistan, up until 2002,2003, RAWA was the “media darling” of the U.S. 
mainstream media; today, however, RAWA is rarely if ever mentioned in articles 
regarding Afghan women. Even articles that specifically address Afghan women activists 
will—perhaps deliberately—leave out any mention of RAWA. Often times an 
anonymous “activist” will be quoted or a representative of a more moderately spoken 
organization will be interviewed.
Some media sources in the US have been critical and wary of RAWA’s use of the 
term “revolutionary” stigmatizing it as “radical” and “leftist”. Much of this is a 
throwback to conxmunist-era red scare tactics and completely ignores RAWA’s definition 
of the term (defined previously). In fact, RAWA’s use of revolutionary to mean 
education and awareness of rights for women is a notion that most Westerners support, 
likely it has been RAWA’s unabashed criticism of US policies in Afghanistan and their




no "Compromise, anti-moderate stance toward fundamentalist that has caused them to be
branded as radical leftists or hardly mentioned at all in US media post-2002. RAWA’s
activities since the U.S.-led invasion have not changed much (as one might believe if
women in Afghanistan were truly liberated and free) (see, analyses in, Thurpkaew, 2002;
Burqa Resistance, 2001 in RAWA in the World Media, 2002 p. 157).
Despite the U.S.’s claim that women’s rights would be fully restored a few years
into the invasion many scholars and women in Afghanistan find that this is not the case.
During a 2011 interview entitled “The Condition of Women Are [sic] Worse”, a member
of RAWA, Reena, noted the following when asked what she and RAWA thought about
the U.S. using women’s rights as a pretext to invade:
Well, using women's rights seemed very ridiculous from the very start. We 
have always said that Bush, that America itself brought back to power, the 
Northern Alliance warlords. [The Northern Alliance is] never going to be 
doing something beneficial for women. The conditions of women are 
worse, as we have seen now.. ..It was very ridiculous that Mr. Bush and 
Laura Bush wanted to help the Afghan women and people. If they did, 
they wouldn't have installed these criminals. They wouldn't have given 
them so much power,... But, [the U.S. is] not really helping [the women, 
the people] with such fundamentalists in power, as proven after ten years 
of the occupation, and of the rule of these warlords. (IColhatkar, 2011)
Early on, RAWA and its supporters could see that life under the U.S.-led
occupying forces was going to be little improvement from the Taliban, because it was
supporting some of brutal Jehadi factions responsible for countless crimes against the
Afghan people from 1992 to 1996. RAWA was one of the only groups to condemn the
Interim Authority, a thirty member council headed by Hamid Karzi; they pointed out that
members of the Northern Alliance, who are well represented in the interim government,
committed some of the most atrocious crimes against women and other Afghan citizens
(Reilly, 2002; Brodsky, 2003). Their website bluntly stated:
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The US ‘War on terrorism’ removed the Taliban regime in October 2001, 
but it has not removed religious fundamentalism which is the main cause 
of all our miseries. In fact, by reinstalling the warlords in power in 
Afghanistan, the US administration is replacing one fundamentalist regime 
with another. The US government and Mr. Karzai mostly rely on Northern 
Alliance criminal leaders who are as brutal and misogynist as the Taliban.
RAWA believes that freedom and democracy can’t be donated; it is the 
duty of the people of a country to fight and achieve these values. Under 
the US-supported government, the sworn enemies of human rights, 
democracy and secularism have gripped their claws over our country and 
attempt to restore their religious fascism on our people.” (“About 
RAWA”, n.d)
To RAWA, the Northern Alliance is still an enemy of women’s rights and justice in 
Afghanistan. For instance, in April of 2002 an armed Northern Alliance fighter entered a 
bookstore where Payam-e Zan was bring sold, he threatened the shopkeeper and 
demanded he reveal who brought the magazines (Brodsky, 2003, p. 178).
Sahar Saba, a RAWA representative who served on the foreign affairs committee 
noted in an interview “People think that everything changed after the Taliban 
collapsed.. .most of those who are now in the government. ..are responsible for violating 
the very basic rights of women.. .there is no guarantee of security for women. Even if 
they say she can go out, they would not because who can guarantee.. . what will happen?” 
(Reilly, 2002). In addition to the continued repressive and uncertain policies of the 
former Jehadi warlords—-who it is said are only different from the Taliban because of 
their western suits—women now face the horrors of open combat again. As Saba noted, 
“the U.S. bombs are still falling which is a big concern for Afghan women—because they 
are again the victim” (Reilly, 2002). In fact there are RAWA teachers and students who 
had stayed in Afghanistan under the Taliban to run the underground schools, yet fled 
when U.S. bombs began to fall on their neighborhoods and Northern Alliance criminals 
marched back into the city (Brodsky, 2003, p. 270).
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Today, the situation has not improved much for women; in fact the situation may 
be regressing in many respects. The following except from a Human Rights Watch 
article describes a few of the improvements to women’s situations and many of the 
setbacks:
Indeed, over the past 10 years there have been significant improvements 
for Afghan women and girls. Official restrictions ended on access to 
education, work, and health care. Millions of girls went to school for the 
first time. Women joined government, won elected office, and became 
police officers and even soldiers. A new constitution in 2004 guaranteed 
women equal rights, and a 2009 law made violence against women a 
crime. Underneath the surface of these changes, however, deep seated 
problems persist. Women in public life have suffered harassment, threats, 
and sometimes murder. Forced marriage, underage marriage, and domestic 
violence are widespread and too widely accepted. About 400 women and 
girls are imprisoned at present for the "moral crimes" of sex outside of 
marriage and simply running away from home, often to flee abuse. While 
education is more accessible, more than half of girls still don’t go to 
school. Every two hours an Afghan woman dies of pregnancy-related 
causes. (Barr, 2012)
In addition, “a report last fall [2011] from Oxfam found that 87 percent of Afghan 
women reported experiencing physical, psychological or sexual abuse or forced 
marriages” (Colson, 2012).
There are countless reports, articles and other pieces of the public transcript 
surrounding women’s condition in Afghanistan; unfortunately many of them document 
its deterioration (see analyses in Colson, 2012; Mohmand, 2012). Even the official 
transcript of women’s rights in Afghanistan has taken a turn for the worst in recent years. 
Despite having signed the “Declaration of Essential Rights of Afghan Women”11 in 2002 
(Goodwin, 2002), in early 2012 Afghanistan’s President Hamid Karzi endorsed a “code 
of conduct” for women issued by a council of clerics that endorses some restrictions in
11 The Declaration “guarantees equality between men and women, equal protection under the law, equal 
right to education in all disciplines, freedom of movement, freedom of speech, and political participation” 
(Goodwin, 2002)
place during the Taliban’s rule (“Hamid Karzai backs restrictive code for women”, 2012). 
One the one hand, “It prohibited a traditional practice of giving a girl to another family to 
resolve a dispute... It spoke against forced marriage. It confirmed women's rights to 
inherit and own property”, on the other hand it stated that “women should not travel 
without a male chaperone. Women should not mix with men while studying, or working, 
or in public. Women must wear the Islamic hijab. Women are secondary to men” (Barr, 
2012, emphasis added).
After the U.S. invasion some things improved. While RAWA began their website 
in 1997, the U.S. invasion and those first couple of years of media attention gained 
RAWA a large audience and most likely numerous donors as well. All of the major 
books written on RAWA were published after 2002 (although Anne Brodsky began her 
work with RAWA in 2000). Such attention and funding gave RAWA the ability to carry 
out more of their projects: for instance, Malalai Hospital which closed in 1994 due to a 
lack of financial support, reopened shortly after the U.S. invasion. Also a majority of the 
publications sent to me by RAWA were published post-2001 and many of the articles on 
RAWA’s website seem to be published after the U.S. invasion as well. This could 
indicate that reporting became easier after the invasion or RAWA became more Internet 
savvy at this time.
However, much as remained the same for RAWA. The security situation on 
Afghanistan, as previously discussed, is still fragile for RAWA, due to the fact that 
former Jehadi members (such as the Northern Alliance) which RAWA has been highly 
critical of are the ones in power. Thus RAWA’s activities have had to remain 
infrapolitical. For example, although RAWA has held some events openly in Kabul, such
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as presentations for International Women’s Day and commemoration on the anniversary 
of Meena’s death (“Some RAWA Past Events”, n.d.), security is still a pressing concern 
and most of their Afghanistan operations—the schools, health clinics, income generating 
projects—still operate in secret. It is crucial to note that all of photos from public events, 
such as International Women’s Day held in Kabul show functions being carried out 
inside buildings—within a more secure social site—while photos of same events held in 
Pakistan show large throngs of women demonstrating outside in public, The evidence 
shows that the U.S occupation has not improved the ability of RAWA to act openly, that 
is, as a “normal” organization working for women’s rights.
Discussion: Shifting Infrapolitics 
Infrapolitics emerge out of necessity—when open resistance would be swiftly and 
brutally subdued, jeopardizing the entire resistance movement. In order to keep such 
resistance alive RAWA and other subordinate groups disguise their resistance to the point 
that it may not seem to outsiders like dissent. A disguised message—a mumble under 
one’s breath in the presence of an elite or a obscure piece of writing - or a disguised 
messenger—a women under a burg a -may never be noticed in the public transcript or 
recorded in the official transcript, but this does not in any way diminish the fact that such 
an act is an act of deliberate resistance. Even a disguised act is still an act that takes 
courage and dignity; according to Scott “dignity is at once a very private and a very 
public attribute” (1990, p. 113).
Based on the aforementioned evidence I have organized my discussion of 
RAWA’s infrapolitics into four main tactics: 1) their gathering together and taking 
action within the hidden transcript; 2) their humanitarian projects, that while appearing to
34
be apolitical to many, are actually infused with an acute political consciousness; 3) their 
employment of disguise tactics such as wearing burqas for anonymity, using certain 
fundamentalist-mandated oppression to stay inconspicuous; 4) and finally their 
organizational style and structure. What is exceptionable about RAWA is their ability to 
oscillate between the first two tactics depending on the political climate and to 
incorporate the latter two into all o f their work I believe it is this unique formula that 
has allowed RAWA to thrive for the last thirty-five years.
From Hidden to Public and Back Again
In this section I argue that RAWA has the prudent ability to shift between the first 
two infrapolitical methods. As Scott notes “the discursive practices off stage sustain 
resistance..(1 9 9 0 , p. 191). This is especially true for RAWA. RAWA began as an 
organization created within the hidden transcript. Nearly all meetings and literacy 
classes, to this day, within Afghanistan are held off the public stage and in secrecy. If it 
were not for the concealed and secure social sites RAWA constructed—both physically 
and through their website—there is little chance that RAWA as an organization would 
have survived. The intimacy and safety created for members not only provided security, 
but produced a social site in which common experiences could be aired and comfort 
given such that and individual women would know that they are not alone, that they are 
part of a community of women who understand their experiences in a war-torn country 
under women-oppressive regimes. A space filled with the aforementioned discourse is 
what Scott is referring to when says discursive practices off stage sustain resistance. 
While women are often isolated from anyone who is not part of their family in 
Afghanistan, the spaces created by RAWA brought women into a place where grievances
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could be aired and resistance discussed. Such sites are where raw anger becomes cooked
indignation. In this case indignation is a sort of awareness, a consciousness. As RAWA
members put it, they were giving women a consciousness, a political consciousness that
made women aware of their rights; a cultural consciousness that showed women that their
neither culture nor their religion were necessarily tools of oppression; and finally, a
consciousness of education that gave women confidence in their own abilities (see
Brodsky, 2003, pp. 105-116). Shaima a senior member of RAWA discussed what
education meant for Afghan women:
The first important issue was to educate women. From the first days we learned 
that they suffered in that way because a lack of education. If not educated.. .then 
they aren’t able to change anything in their lives... [Also] from the very first days 
we talked about,. .that we couldn’t limit [education] to just literacy classes; that 
would not bring the change that we wanted nor the consciousness. School 
education was not enough. (Brodsky, 2002, pp. 44-45)
RAWA were experts in maintaining a social site to foster their hidden transcript which
was propagated through the education of hundreds of women, as well as young girls and
boys.
From the clandestine social site that hid their resistance and conscious building 
discourse, RAWA easily moved into their more outward, yet equally disguised tactic of 
humanitarian projects. According to Scott, “so long as we confine our concept of the 
political to activity that is openly declared we are driven to.. .miss the immense political 
terrain that lies between quiescence and revolt” (Scott, 1990, p. 199). One of RAWA’s 
most meaningful resistance tactics, which lies in the terrain between quiescence and 
revolt, is their humanitarian projects. Education, as noted, has been an essential part of 
RAWA since its founding. While liberal democratic theorists may not understand 
education and learning to be overtly political acts, RAWA gives women an education
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infused with political consciousness, and giving them such a consciousness is a 
revolution. Furthermore, many of the children who were raised in RAWA’s Watan 
schools, orphanages, and other classes have become dedicated members and supporters 
themselves. The rest of RAWA’s public projects all appear outwardly to be innocent acts 
of charity for women, free of a political resistance agenda. These include distribution of 
emergency aid items such as food, blankets, cooking oil etc; medical care, including 
medical clinics and hospitals, and income generating projects (RAWA, n.cL “RAWA: 
voice of the voiceless”). Just as the children who were raised and educated by RAWA 
come to respect or even support RAWA, the same respect and support is hopefully 
developed in those RAWA aids through their humanitarian services.
To maintain their struggle for resistance, RAWA shifted between these 
aforementioned tactics: actions with the hidden transcript; seemingly apolitical, 
humanitarian work; and when circumstances allowed—in Pakistan and early in the Soviet 
occupation, and at times under the U.S. occupation—RAWA shifts to open resistance 
performed on the public stage, such as protests, demonstrations, speaking tours, and 
documentation of human rights abuses though publications and their website. The 
shifting nature of RAWA’s political tactics are apparent to those within the organization. 
As Nadia, a senior member of RAWA, observed:
At different points, as a result of many years of war, RAWA had to 
change its policy. For example, during the Soviets our policy and struggle 
was along with the rest of the population as part of the resistance. During 
the fundamentalists this changed: it was not resistance alongside others, 
but we were a women’s organization alone and had to change our struggle 
and standpoints accordingly. During the Taliban, we didn’t see much 
difference between them and the Jehadis before them; the struggle was the 
same, but the methods had to change. For example, we increased our 
home-based schools for girls and for women. But generally we have 
never had activities in Afghanistan that we wanted—activities that could
be open and expanded enough to each everyone who needs our help Now 
in tins situation there is another period of change.” (Brodsky, 2003, p.
102)
Infrapolitics in Organization and the Art of Disguise
Here I discuss RAWA’s infrapolitical methods as they are utilized within the 
organization’s structure and especially through their various disguise tactics. Scott notes 
that infrapolitics “extends to.. .organization” as well as to substantive actions. 
Furthermore, Scott states, “informal assemblages of market, neighbors, family and 
community.. .provide both a structure and cover for resistance” (1990, p.200). RAWA 
utilizes infrapolitics in its organization in both ways: structure and cover.
First, RAWA’s structural organization is a perfect example of resistance born 
from and maintained by infrapolitics. While RAWA is a formal organization, it began as 
and thrives off of tight-knit, informal networks of women—family members, teachers, 
students, neighbors, As the organization grew and become more sophisticated it 
maintained a wide-spread, non-hierarchical, community-based structure (Brodsky, 2003).
Second, Afghan culture provided excellent cover for the infrapolitical 
organization of women. It is not only normal but expected that women, typically related 
through extensive kinship networks, would frequently visit one another in the private of 
their homes—a perfect place for harboring the hidden transcript. The “elementary 
[organization]... of infrapolitics [has] an alternative, innocent existence” (Scott, 1990, p. 
200), that lends to their disguise; and what could be more innocent than the commonplace 
Afghan familial gatherings? “Always, the age-old women’s culture of Afghanistan that 
oppressed also sustained them.. .RAWA turned every common women’s custom into a 
tool of liberation” (Chavis, 2003, p. 65). While long lasting gatherings of men may draw
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suspicion, it was quite normal for women to gather and chat with family member long
periods. And early on, before the rise of the Jehadis women would spend hours at public
bath houses where they could talk and exchange resistance literature, again, with little
suspicion. Even the Jehadi-imposed practice of having a mahram automatically provided
RAWA women with security guards and a use for male allies. “Paradoxically, RAWA
benefits in some small ways from a culture that undervalues and also underestimates
women. ..The cultural assumptions that dismiss women as inconsequential, against which
they struggle.. .have actually worked in their favor” (Brodsky, 2003, p. 178).
The publication of Pqyam~e Zan is also another interesting use of disguising the
messenger, or anonymity. While the messages within the magazine where not at all
hidden and their name and logo appeared on the magazine, it still was a tactic of
anonymity because individual women were rarely identified by name. In fact the entire
entity of RAWA itself—and the women’s discursive practice of referring to it as a
collective whole, instead of individual women themselves—is a tactic of anonymity.
One of the most intriguing anonymity tactics—because Afghan women literally
don a disguise and veil themselves—is the burqa. Donia. a woman whose mother was an
early RAWA member, describes a memory of Meena from the days when RAWA still
operated in Kabul,
I remember she would wear a burqa, at the time all the members of 
RAWA wore them. For me it was so strange the first time I saw her 
wearing [a] burqa because I knew she hated them... So one day I asked her 
why she was wearing it and she said “If I don’t wear it I will be 
recognized and killed.” (Brodsky, 2003, p. 72)
Although most modern and educated women, like Meena, originally rejected the burqa as
an outdated form of oppression for women, they adopted the attire to carry out their
clandestine work, by hiding their identities and carrying contraband. While wearing a 
burqa, “they were not only anonymous, but they appeared to be their own opposites:” 
conservative, obedient, traditional, harmless women (Chavis, 2003, p. 66).
Finally, RAWA’s website is another practice in anonymity. Web pages prove to 
be a curious blending of hidden and public transcripts. While it is available for the entire 
world to view (unlike a conversation in a truly hidden, private social site, like a home), it 
is a true reflection of the discourse taking place in the hidden transcript because it is 
unhindered by the public discourse of the dominant; that is, what RAWA posts on its 
website is posted independent of (while often in reaction to) the oppression of the 
dominant group. As previously mentioned, it is one of RAWA’s greatest strengths as a 
resistance organization and also demonstrates their amazing ability to adapt, not only to 
the oppression they face, but also to fast pasted technological change outside 
Afghanistan’s borders.
Theoretical Limitations
Scott’s discourse theory, particularly his notion of infrapolitics, gives a near­
perfect framework with which to analyze RAWA’s resistance tactics. While the 
definition of resistance may be expanding in mainstream political thought, it has still 
been a long held belief that to resist is to act openly—to march and demonstrate, to 
revolt, to take up arms. What Scott offers in his description of a hidden transcript—the 
pre-explosive beginning to open resistance—is a rare look into the type of resistance that 
does not make it into the history books. In using discourse theory to examine the hidden 
transcript and infrapolitical tactics of RAWA we come to see actions that may have once 
been overlooked, as inspiring methods of political resistance.
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Scott nicely captures the flow from articulated anger, or grievance at an 
oppressive situation, to the "cooked” indignation that leads to methodical, prudent action. 
Furthermore, by examining the most oppressive scenarios imaginable—scenarios where 
there is no political outlet for grievances—he gives political credibility to the world’s 
most oppressed people who do not have the luxury of open political expression protected 
by rights. The women of RAWA are one of those most oppressed groups. In 1997 when 
their website was first launched, it said “Welcome to the website of the most oppressed 
women in the world”. To rely only on liberal democratic notions of political resistance 
would be to miss such a wide range of RAWA’s political resistance strategy. Because of 
Scott’s concept of infrapolitics, we are able to examine RAWA’s every political move, 
no matter how disguised.
In many ways, however, Scott’s somewhat narrow definition of infrapolitics 
failed to fully capture what I believe to be RAWA’s rich infrapolitical tactics. Unlike 
Scott’s notion of infrapolitics, which specifically argues that infrapolitics are subtle, 
unorganized, pre-open resistance actions, RAWA’s tactics are not completely pre-open 
resistance. Scott describes resistance movements that adhere to a very linear framework: 
discourse within the hidden transcript leads to infrapolitics, which leads to an explosive 
moment where the hidden transcript is finally expressed in the public, which leads to 
open resistance. RAWA, in contrast, fluidly moves between discussions within the 
hidden transcripts to humanitarian projects to public demonstrations.
Furthermore, Scott never examined examples of formal organization. He limited 
his analysis to pre-organizational cases, which was problematic for me in examining a 
group such as RAWA which has continued to utilize the hidden transcript, infrapolitical
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tactics and methods of disguise, despite being formally organized. Scott’ argument for 
infrapolitics within both hidden and public transcripts, climaxes with his explanation of 
that explosive hidden-meets-public transcript moment. For an organization like RAWA 
that cannot trace its resistance to a singular “explosive moment,” Scott’s framework can 
be somewhat limited. Also it should be noted that Scott’s work, Domination and the Arts 
o f Resistance: Hidden Transcripts, was published in 1990, well before the age of the 
internet. This explains why RAWA’s use of a publicly exposed hidden transcript in their 
website, was unfathomable to Scott. Overall, Scott’s work provided a framework that 
made all of RAWA’s resistance tactics politically relevant, and RAWA’s ability to shift 
between open and disguised resistance, their humanitarian projects, and organization 
style add layers of depth to Scott’s original analysis.
Conclusion
Revolution is a delicate thing. It grows in the hidden away spaces of oppressed 
groups. As feelings of anger, frustration, hopelessness fester, resistance is cultivated, 
indignation bums and revolution takes root. Prudence and cunning, patience and disguise 
are principles that keep the revolution of oppressed people alive. Without legitimate 
channels to express their indignation, those who foster revolution in these hidden places 
run a greater risk and struggle against greater odds, yet they have so much more to gain.
The revolution being cultivated by RAWA has been thirty-five years in the 
making. This is not a revolution that will over throw one ideological regime and replace 
it with another. No, RAWA’s revolution seeks, through incremental, steadfast action 
lasting change that will give women not only security and peace of mind, but the status of 
human being—not to be “liberated”, “honored”, or “taken care of’—but as fully
educated, equal and able to make decision about their own lives, and about their country 
as well.
During their thirty-five year history RAWA faced four major regimes that all 
engaged in domination tactics to keep RAWA from achieving its goals. These four 
regimes were the Soviets, the Jehadis, the Taliban, and the U.S./Northern Alliance.
These four regimes made use of the following tactics in efforts to keep a hold of power: 
concealment of any cracks in their display of control or news that would discredit them, 
euphemism in describing their own actions and stigmatization of RAWA.
To cope with harsh oppression RAWA, in both hidden and public social sites 
utilized disguise and anonymity as part of their infrapolitical strategy. RAWA’s tactics 
are infrapolitical in that they do not always appear to be “normal” politics, and they rarely 
occur out in the open. RAWA applied infrapolitics in the following four ways: 1) in 
gathering together and acting the hidden transcript; 2) through seemingly apolitical 
humanitarian projects, 3) by employing disguise tactics such as wearing burqas for 
anonymity, using certain fundamentalist-mandated oppression; 4) and through their 
organizational style and structure. However, what makes RAWA’s strategy unique is 
their ability shift between the first two tactics and to incorporate the latter two into all of 
their work.
There is a reason why in 1977 a twenty year old girl, bright and dark eyed, chose 
the word “revolutionary”, as I read her story and the story of the women of RAWA I 
know why. They saw beyond the horizon into a tomorrow where women of their country 





“No One Asked Their Names”
A list of the dead and wounded victims of the March 11,2012 massacre in Kandahar, 
Afghanistan.
The dead:
Mohamed Dawood son of Abdullah




Shatarina daughter o/'Sultan Mohamed 
Zahra daughter o f Abdul Hamid 
Nazia daughter o/Dost Mohamed 
Masooma daughter o/Mohamed Wazir 
Farida daughter o/Mohamed Wazir 
Palwasha daughter o/'Mohamed Wazir 
Nabia daughter o/Mohamed Wazir 
Esmatullah daughter o/'Mohamed Wazir 
Faizullah son o/Mohamed Wazir 
Essa Mohamed son o/Mohamed Hussain 
Akhtar Mohamed son o/Murrad Ali
The wounded:
Haji Mohamed Naim son o/Haji Sakhawat





12 (“No one asked their names”, 2012)
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